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Learning the network structure of a large graph is computationally de-
manding, and dynamically monitoring the network over time for any changes
in structure threatens to be more challenging still.
This paper presents a two-stage method for anomaly detection in dynamic
graphs: the first stage uses simple, conjugate Bayesian models for discrete
time counting processes to track the pairwise links of all nodes in the graph
to assess normality of behavior; the second stage applies standard network
inference tools on a greatly reduced subset of potentially anomalous nodes.
The utility of the method is demonstrated on simulated and real data sets.
1. Introduction. Anomaly detection on graphs of social or communication
networks has important security applications. The definition of a graph anomaly
typically depends on the data and application of interest. Typically anomaly detec-
tion focuses on the connections among the graph’s entities and various methods
have been developed for their analysis. Examples include spectral decompositions
[an area excellently summarized in von Luxburg (2007)], scan statistics [Priebe et
al. (2005)] and random walks [Pan et al. (2004), Tong, Faloutsos and Pan (2006)].
These methods are generally computationally demanding when applied to very
large networks; also, in deciding upon which one to use, an explicit choice is be-
ing made on the type of anomaly sought. The interest of this paper is anomaly
detection in large dynamic networks, in a context where in principle any type of
anomaly should be detected. We focus on problems relating to anomalies in social
networks, and present analyses of real and simulated data from this area. In each
case, the network is observed over a sequence of discrete times, where each obser-
vation provides only a partial view of the full connectivity; a complete view of the
network is provided by the time series as a whole.
The real data come from the European Commission Joint Research Centre’s
(JRC) European Media Monitor (EMM) (http://emm.jrc.it). EMM is a web intel-
ligence service, providing real-time press and media summaries to Commission
cabinets and services, including a breaking news and alerting service. This service
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requires JRC to parse each of the news documents to extract the relevant infor-
mation and tag the story as belonging to a particular topic. For our analysis, JRC
provided 131 weeks of Media Monitor data sourced from a collection of approved
websites, starting from 1st January 2005, although this period includes a known
two-week server downtime at the end of the first month. The data were extracted
from news articles tagged as being related to terrorist attacks, political unrest and
security. The data we receive are undirected and in a simple list format showing
the date of a reported link and the names of the two individuals involved.
The simulated data come from the VAST Challenge 2008 (http://www.cs.umd.
edu/hcil/VASTchallenge08); we consider the simulated cell phone data from the
Mini Challenge focused in the area of social network analysis. The cell phone call
records cover a fictional ten-day period on an island, narrowed to 400 unique cell
phones during this period. As well as the time of each phone call and details of
who phoned whom, an identifier of the cell tower from which the call originated
is also given. The records should provide critical information about an important
social network structure. From the results of award winning published work on this
challenge [Ye et al. (2008)], work which used a combination of PageRank [Brin
and Page (1998)] and visual analytic methods, there is good reason to suspect that
the major anomalous activity occurs on the eighth day and involves a list of at least
eleven individuals.
2. Two-stage approach. The idea behind the method presented here is a sim-
ple one: If a social network has fundamentally changed in some important way,
then in most contexts this is likely to suggest that there are some individuals who
are now either communicating more or less frequently than usual, or communi-
cating with different individuals than usual. Beyond this view, there may well be
much more subtle network structure to examine, but initially taking this more sim-
ple view allows good targets to be quickly identified, with the important possibility
to then zoom-in and investigate such local structure.
In this paper we present a two-stage approach to dynamic anomaly detec-
tion. The first stage is a sweep of the database to identify potentially anom-
alous nodes in the network; in the second stage, a subgraph is constructed around
this set of nodes, usually extended to include other nodes which have recently
(or, perhaps, ever) communicated with a node in this set, and then standard net-
work analytic tools are used to investigate structure in this vastly reduced subnet-
work.
Technically, for each pair of individuals we independently model the commu-
nications between them over time as a counting process, with the increments of
the process following a Bayesian probability model. At any point in time, we test
whether their relationship has changed to a degree that is statistically significant.
If the derived predictive p-value falls below a fixed threshold, this represents a
departure from previously modeled behavior. The node pair are then said to be
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anomalous and are added to the set of anomalous nodes for this period. Such an
approach is statistically principled and computationally very simple. By assuming
independence of the processes, the method is also fully parallelizable, in the sense
that each node pair is examined in isolation. This assumption of independence will
be approximately acceptable only in some circumstances, and a method which
seeks to relax this assumption is considered in Section 3.4.
Once a reduced subset of interesting nodes has been identified, standard network
tools such as spectral clustering can be much more readily deployed; also, at this
stage we are now interested in the simpler problem of characterizing structure,
such as identifying clusters, rather than looking for changes in this structure, the
latter being a task which requires additional metrics to be specified.
The threshold at which p-values are judged to be significant must be set by
the user. In this paper we use a 0.05 threshold, but smaller or larger critical values
would lead to correspondingly smaller or larger networks of potentially anomalous
nodes. In practice, a good threshold can be chosen to be as large as possible subject
to the resulting anomaly network being of a manageable size such that follow-up
investigation is feasible.
3. Discrete time counting process models. The number of communications
over time are treated as simple Bayesian discrete time counting processes with con-
ditionally independent increments. For each period in time, the number of commu-
nications between individuals will represent the current weight of their association
in the network.
We first consider some different ways of counting up the communications.
Then, simple Bayesian probability models are given for learning about such count-
ing processes. Full details of these probability models and the parameterizations
used are given in Supplement A [Heard et al. (2010)].
3.1. Pairwise, individual and total activity analysis. For each pair of individ-
uals (i, j), starting from time 0 when the data collection process begins, let Nij (t)
be the number of communications made from i to j up until discrete time t ; al-
ternatively, for a simpler binary view of the network, let Nij (t) be the number of
periods in which i has communicated with j by time t . If the graph is undirected,
we have the simplification Nij (t) ≡ Nji(t).
Let Pij be a probability model for the increments dNij (t) = Nij (t)−Nij (t −1)
under normal circumstances. In the simplest setting, we can consider dNij (1),
dNij (2), . . . as independent realizations from Pij ; the distribution Pij corresponds
to the normal mode of communication behavior for this pair of individuals. Anom-
alous behavior at time t , on the other hand, can be regarded as a value of dNij (t)
drawn from a distribution other than Pij . The aim is then to detect which values of
dNij (t) are not draws from the unknown Pij .
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For a realized value of dNij (t) = n, we find a two-sided Bayesian p-value as
the posterior probability of observing a count as extreme as n; this posterior dis-
tribution is a marginal calculation based on our revised beliefs about the unknown
distribution Pij in light of all other periods of data we have observed. Carefully
chosen conjugate Bayesian models allow for this inferential process to be ana-
lytically tractable [see Bernardo and Smith (1994) for details]. For example, a
(simplistic) parametric choice for Pij could be Poisson(λij ) for unknown rate pa-
rameter λij > 0. Completing the model specification with a gamma prior for λij
ensures the posterior predictive distribution for a future period is calculable as
a simple ratio of Poisson–gamma mass functions. Where no obvious parametric
form for Pij exists, nonparametric Bayesian inference is available via the Dirich-
let process [Ferguson (1973)].
In the absence of specific prior information about any of the nodes, identical
prior distributions are adopted for each of the node pair counting processes Nij (t).
So in the first observation period, each node pair has the same probability of be-
ing active and, hence, the implied model on the whole network belongs to the
well-known class of exponential random graph models (ERGMs) [Wasserman and
Pattison (1996)]. From the second time period onward, however, the posterior pre-
dictive distributions will differ between node pairs according to the activity which
has been observed and so here we see a departure from ERGMs.
The framework above can be regarded as an independent, pairwise analysis
of the members of the network. If dNij (t) is the adjacency of node i to node j
at time t , then a similar individual-based analysis considers the outdegree and
indegree of node i, given by the respective increments of
Ni·(t) =
∑
j =i
Nij (t),(3.1)
N·i (t) =
∑
j =i
Nji(t).(3.2)
These two summed processes correspond to the number of outgoing [Equa-
tion (3.1)] and incoming [Equation (3.2)] communications over time for individ-
ual i. For an undirected graph the indegree and outdegree are equivalent and Equa-
tion (3.2) is redundant. Again, we can assume exchangeable increments following
similar probability models for these processes and look for outlying values in each
time period.
Finally, as a highest level summary, we can monitor the degree sum of the net-
work over time, given by the increments of
N··(t) =
∑
i
∑
j>i
Nij (t) or N··(t) =
∑
i
∑
j =i
Nij (t),
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where the two definitions correspond to undirected and directed graphs respec-
tively. Such processes monitor the overall network activity level. Again, the same
conjugate Bayesian probability models can be applied at this level.
3.2. Parametric inference and hurdle models. Social network graphs are typi-
cally sparse [Faloutsos, McCurley and Tomkins (2004)]. Particularly in larger net-
works, most pairs of individuals will not communicate with one another, suggest-
ing a vanishing fraction of node pairs actually have an edge between them. This
sparsity can be seen as providing an analytical advantage here, as there will be
fewer nontrivial node pair relationships in the graph.
However, when the network is viewed temporally, the sparsity of the network
is further increased. As we will see in the examples later, even individuals who
are related will spend much of the time not communicating. This type of spar-
sity is problematic when modeling the counting processes, as the large number of
time periods showing zero communications mean that standard exponential family
distributions are inappropriate for modeling normal behavior.
We extend the exponential family probability models to their hurdle variants
[Mullahy (1986)], which incorporate additional probability variables for determin-
ing whether or not the node pair are active in a given period t . The modeling of
the process dNij (t) is split into two parts, first a hurdle process for determining
whether dNij (t) = 0 or dNij (t) > 0, and then second another stochastic process
governing the value taken by dNij (t) at those times when the hurdle process dic-
tates that dNij (t) > 0.
At time t let Aij (t) be the number of time periods u ≤ t in which dNij (u) > 0,
meaning the node pair (i, j) were active. The increment for time t , dAij (t) =
Aij (t) − Aij (t − 1) takes value 0 or 1, with dAij (t) = 1 indicating the pair were
active in time period t . A counting process model with Bernoulli increments spec-
ifies Aij (t).
For times when the two individuals are active, the hurdle model also requires
a second model for the increments dNij (t) ≥ 1. We use the shifted quantities
dNij (t) − 1 ≥ 0 to define the increments of a second counting process dBij (s)
by the equations
dBij (s) = dNij (ts) − 1, s = 1,2,3, . . . ,
ts = min{t :Aij (t) = s},
with resulting counting process Bij (s) =∑su=1 dBij (u).
For the hurdle model we therefore need to specify two (typically indepen-
dent) models for the counting processes Bij (·) and Aij (·). Assuming indepen-
dence of Aij (·) and Bij (·), the increments of the compensator ij (·) for the
process Nij (·) can be expressed as
dij (t) = E[dNij (t)|Ht−1] = E[dAij (t)|Ht−1](E[dBij (t)|Ht−1] + 1),
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where for N(t) = {Nij (t) : i = j}, Ht = {N(u)|u = 0,1,2, . . . , t} is the history of
the processes up until time t . Then, since
E[dN2ij (t)|Ht−1] = E[dAij (t)|Ht−1]
(
E
[(
dBij (t) + 1)2|Ht−1])
= E[dAij (t)|Ht−1]{var[dBij (t)|Ht−1] + 1}
+ dij (t)E[dBij (t)|Ht−1],
it follows that the increments of the predictable variation of the counting process
martingale Mij (t) = Nij (t) − ij (t) satisfy
d〈Mij (t)〉 = E[dAij (t)|Ht−1]{var[dBij (t)|Ht−1] + 1}
+ dij (t)E[dBij (t)|Ht−1] − d2ij (t).
These equations can be used for checking how well the models for Nij (t) compare
in fitting the data.
3.2.1. Bernoulli process. The hurdle process increments {dAij (t)} are most
simply treated as a Bernoulli process
dAij (t) ∼ Bernoulli(πij ), t = 1,2,3, . . . ,
where 1 −πij can now be much greater than the zero count probability prescribed
by standard exponential family models. Note that this assumes independence of
the increments.
3.2.2. Markov chain. To enable simple dependence on the activity status in
the previous time period, an alternative Markov model instead considers
φij = Pr(dAij (t) = 1|dAij (t − 1) = 1),(3.3)
ψij = Pr(dAij (t) = 1|dAij (t − 1) = 0).(3.4)
For a comparable marginal probability to πij in the Bernoulli process model,
note that the stationary distribution for this Markov chain implies an equilibrium
probability for the pair (i, j) being active [dAij (t) = 1] at any particular time t
given by
ψij
1 + ψij − φij .
Model specification for Bij can use standard exponential family distributions
such as Poisson or geometric; combined with conjugate beta priors for the hurdle
probabilities above, we retain fully conjugate Bayesian inference for Nij (t).
BAYESIAN ANOMALY DETECTION METHODS FOR SOCIAL NETWORKS 651
3.3. Nonparametric inference. If, even with the hurdle extensions, it is still
unclear what would be a suitably simple parametric model for the number of com-
munications, then a useful conjugate, nonparametric Bayesian alternative is the
Dirichlet process (DP) of Ferguson (1973). Using a base measure which is a small
positive scalar multiple of, say, a hurdle exponential family distribution, allows
fully coherent but data driven inference which is largely reliant on the tail proba-
bilities of the empirical histogram of observed counts.
3.4. Multinomial extensions. For directed graphs, a related approach consid-
ers using the ideas above to first model the overall counting process of activity, say,
for an individual i. Then, given a particular number of communications involving
individual i, we consider categorical modeling of which classes of communication
they will be. The classes could correspond to other individuals in the network, or
if the links are labeled with categorical types, these classes could be the link types
observed.
Suppose dNi·(t) = n, so in the t th time period individual i makes n com-
munications. Concentrating on whom the communications were with, let pij
be the probability that any contact made by individual i will be to indi-
vidual j . Then assuming independence between subsequent communications,
dNij (t) ∼ Binomial(n,pij ). More generally, using the vector notation dNi−(t) =
(dNi1(t), . . . , dNi(i−1)(t), dNi(i+1)(t), . . .),
dNi−(t) ∼ Multinomial(n,pi−).
Standard conjugate Bayesian inference under the multinomial model uses a Dirich-
let prior for the class probabilities; see Bernardo and Smith (1994).
For a familiar goodness-of-fit hypothesis test of multinomial data, we could
contrast the observed counts dNij (t) with the expected npij through the familiar
likelihood ratio test statistic
2
∑
j :dNij (t)>0
dNij (t) log
(
dNij (t)
nE(pij )
)
,
so performing a χ2 significance test. However, such a test would not incorporate
uncertainty in the overall number of communications, as it is based conditionally
on observing dNi·(t) = n. Hence, we obtain an augmented likelihood ratio test
statistic
2
[ ∑
j :dNij (t)>0
dNij (t) log
(
dNij (t)
nE(pij )
)
− log{Pi·(dNi·(t) = n)}
]
,
which also takes into account the uncertainty in dNi·(t).
In summary, a probability model for the overall counting process Ni·(t) for
individual i, along with the multinomial model, specifies joint a distribution for
the pairwise counting processes {Nij (t)}. The induced dependence of these split
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counting processes on one another will depend on the nature of the probability
model for the total number of observations Ni·(t); in the special case where this
model is Poisson, the processes will be independent of one another.
4. Sequential and retrospective analyses. Typically data for a dynamic so-
cial network will arrive as an online stream. At each discrete time t we will have
two inferential possibilities. The first is to decide whether the new data at t is
anomalous compared to the previous data gathered, to which we give the term
sequential analysis. For sequential analysis at time t , we are concerned with the
distribution Pr(dNij (t)|Ht−1). The second possibility is to revise our decisions
about all previous periods in light of the new data, to which we give the term ret-
rospective analysis. For retrospective analysis at time t , we are concerned with the
distributions {Pr(dNij (u)|Ht /N(u)) : 1 ≤ u ≤ t}, where Ht /N(u) represents the
history of the processes if their values at time u were not observed.
The difference between sequential and retrospective analyses is most pro-
nounced for times near the start of the process. In sequential analysis, it is un-
likely that the earliest time points will be flagged as being anomalous, since early
on there are very few data points with which to compare the current observation.
However, in retrospective analysis, we can look back to these early time points and
now revise our opinion, in light of all that has been seen since, as to whether those
periods were in fact anomalous.
Retrospective analysis can be seen as the more thorough inferential tool, as it
contains sequential analysis as a special case. Sequential analysis alone is faster
and more immediately relevant. Once the process has been running for sufficiently
long, subsequent retrospective analyses of a much earlier time point should even-
tually converge in opinion, as should the retrospective and sequential analyses for
more recent time points.
5. Results.
5.1. EMM. Here we apply our anomaly detection methods to the real EMM
network data provided by JRC. The weekly counts of the contacts made by all in-
dividuals found in news website stories relating to terrorist attacks, political unrest
or security between 1 January 2005 and 11 July 2007 are shown in the top panel
of Figure 1.
The counting process and compensator for the activity of the whole network are
shown in the second row of Figure 1. These results have been obtained from the
sequential Dirichlet process model with an uninformative negative binomial base
measure [using parameter pairs (0.1,0.01) for whole network analysis, and later
(0.1,0.1) for individual and pairwise analyses; see Appendix D of Supplement A,
Heard et al. (2010)]; parametric analysis with a hurdle Poisson–gamma mixture
with the same parameters gives very similar results. Unsurprisingly, the compen-
sator is over-predicting activity during the known server downtime occurring in
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FIG. 1. Top: The number of contacts made each week by all individuals in the EMM data set.
2nd row: The counting process and compensator for the whole network activity under the sequential
Dirichlet process model. 3rd row: The martingale residuals; the dashed lines represent 2 times the
square root of the predictable variation of the process. 4th row: The sequential analysis predictive
p-values for the observed counts; crosses indicate values falling below a 0.05 threshold. Bottom:
p-values from retrospective analysis.
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the first month, and has subsequently under-predicted the total cumulative activity
for a long while after this experience. Note that the counting process martingale
increments and their predictable variation (third row of Figure 1) stabilize much
earlier than this, with the only major departures of the residuals from ±2 standard
deviations occurring at the corresponding spikes in the count data. These points
also coincide with the lowest predictive p-values in the fourth row of Figure 1.
Note that most of the remaining significant p-values (using a 0.05 threshold) in
this graph correspond to highly negative martingale residuals, suggestive of fur-
ther possible server downtimes.
It is instructive to note that the sequential analysis p-values do not show the
known server downtime to be significant. This is because we are still very much in
the learning phase when the server failure occurs, and with uninformative prior be-
liefs the downtime is quite acceptable; rather, it is the period immediately after the
downtime that is deemed anomalous. In contrast, a retrospective analysis (bottom
panel of Figure 1) conducted at the end of the study correctly shows the downtime
to be the anomalous period, with very small p-values.
For the pairwise and individual analyses we simply discard all data before the
known server downtime. Overall, there are 1814 individuals involved in the net-
work through the course of the observation period. The most directly connected
individual is the president of the United States of America during the data collec-
tion period, George W. Bush, eventually making connections with 179 other nodes.
But as mentioned earlier, social network graphs are typically sparse and here only
2817 of the possible 1,644,391 node connections are ever made.
Across parametric and nonparametric models, the highest count of anomalous
nodes identified through either individual behavior or pairwise interactions occurs
on the 73rd week after the downtime, ending 28 June 2006 (see Figure 2). Interest-
ingly, this was a time of continuing violence in the Middle East, which a fortnight
later would see the beginning of the the 2006 Lebanon War; it was also a week
in which the Sudanese government was in disagreement with the United Nations
over humanitarian involvement in the conflict in Darfur. The extended network
from spectral clustering of all communicators in that week is shown in Figure 3,
and important figures from the stories mentioned can be seen toward the top of
the network. Nodes or links identified as anomalous, according to the individual
or pairwise Poisson–gamma analyses respectively, are highlighted in red.
Taking an example pair of anomalous behaving nodes from the network in Fig-
ure 3, in Figure 4 we briefly examine the relationship of Ehud Olmert and Mah-
moud Abbas. Mr. Olmert became Prime Minister of Israel on 4 January 2006 (this
is apparent from his growing profile in the top panel of Figure 4), and Mr. Abbas
has been President of the Palestinian National Authority from 15 January 2005.
In the interesting week ending 28 June 2006, both individuals are showing higher
than usual individual activity (although not their highest ever, see the top two pan-
els of Figure 4); but more significantly, when viewed as a pair (bottom panel of
Figure 4) they are showing a high peak of connectivity in the week ending 28 June
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FIG. 2. The number of active nodes each week (top) and then the number of anomalous nodes
found each week respectively under two models, the hurdle Poisson–gamma and the DP with Pois-
son–gamma base measure.
2006 which is unmatched at any other time over the observation period; during that
week, they had met in person for the first time since Mr. Olmert had taken office,
and had agreed to a first official summit. Clearly this behavior should be consid-
ered anomalous and, thus, they take their place in the larger network of interesting
nodes in Figure 3.
5.2. VAST 2008. The simulated call data from the IEEE VAST 2008 Chal-
lenge are recorded in real time, and have sufficient realism that phone calls are not
seen to be made uniformly throughout the day, rather there are peak and off-peak
periods. With only ten days of data, to avoid modeling of daily cyclical effects
and obtain a sufficient number of homogeneous calling periods for analysis, we
used the histogram of daily phone calls over the ten days across the whole of the
network (Figure 5, top left) to identify the broad phone call pattern; the day was
then broken up into five subintervals of equal call frequencies with respect to the
histogram. Thus, we obtain fifty relatively homogeneous periods for our analysis
(Figure 5, top right).
From the results of Ye et al. (2008) we should suspect that the major anomalous
activity begins on the eighth day. This is not apparent from Figure 5, which on
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George W. Bush
Tony Blair 
Kofi Annan
Dick Cheney
Donald Rumsfeld
Condoleezza Rice
Pervez Musharraf
John Howard
Junichiro Koizumi
Gordon Brown
Yasser Arafat
Hamid Karzai
Hosni Mubarak
Javier Solana
John Reid
Abdullah Gül
Alexander Downer
Tassos Papadopoulos
Vojislav Koatunica
Ali Khamenei
Manmohan Singh
Robert Mueller
Ehud Olmert
Mullah Omar
Michael Bloomberg
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
Shimon Peres
Yoweri Museveni
Mehmet Ali Talat
George Casey
Laura Bush
Joseph Biden
Philip Ruddock
Jalal Talabani
Des Browne
Stephen Harper
Rajiv Gandhi
Omar el-Bashir
Ehud Barak
James Jones
Mahmoud Abbas
Mahmoud Othman
Mark Warner Clare Short
Tzipi Livni
Abdoulaye Wade
Alpha Oumar Konare
Alex Salmond
Khaled Mashal
Vaughn Walker
Frank-Walter Steinmeier
Ayman al-Zawahiri
Emile Lahoud
Amir Peretz
Haim Ramon
Xanana Gusma˝o
Marí Alkatiri
Norman Mineta
Brendan Nelson
David Cameron
Joseph Kony
Shami Chakrabarti 
Mangala Samaraweera
Taro Aso
Indira Gandhi
Larry King
Elie Wiesel
Dan Halutz
Ismail Haniya
John King
Omar Karami
Manouchehr Mottaki
Nouri al-Maliki
Ali Larijani
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
Sergey Kislyak
Thomas Schieffer
Samir Geagea
László Sólyom
Brad Berenson
Rangin Dadfar Spanta
Riek Machar
Tony Snow
FIG. 3. Network of all active individuals for the week ending 28 June 2006. Anomalous links (under
sequential Dirichlet process analysis) and individuals are highlighted in red. The nodes and links of
this graph are interactive in the online version of this paper.
the bottom row also shows the number of active nodes making or receiving calls
in each period and the total minutes called across the network in each period.
Together, these plots do not reveal any departures from normality until the end
of the ninth day. Clearly then, from a perspective of timely anomaly detection,
this anomalous behavior is not going to simply coincide with just a change in the
overall activity of the network. It can be noted here that an improvement offered
by our following sequential analysis over the methods used by Ye et al. (2008) is
that the latter made use of the data across all of the ten days to detect the major
change in the social network; our aim will be to detect the anomaly in (discretized)
real time.
For these data it seems appropriate to use the Markov formulation given in
Equations (3.3) and (3.4); across all individuals in the data set, the mean empiri-
cal estimates of φi. and ψi. would be 0.63 and 0.48 respectively, so an individual
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FIG. 4. Individual news report frequencies for Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas, followed by
reported contacts between the pair.
making calls becomes more likely to continue making calls into the next period.
Because this data set is quite short, we choose to construct empirical priors using
overall means and variances across all of the call data to get broad insights into
typical call volumes and their variability, which would hopefully mirror the type
of prior knowledge which should be available from a domain expert. Similar but
not identical results can still be achieved with uninformative priors.
Figure 6(left) shows the number of anomalies we find in each time segment
under a sequential individual analysis of the call network nodes using a simple
Bernoulli “on–off” view of node activity but incorporating the Markov assump-
tion. There is a clear maximum at the start of the eighth day. All eight of the
anomalous nodes found are from the list deduced by Ye et al. (2008) using all of
the data and several combined methodologies.
A spectral cluster plot made using two components of the symmetric Lapla-
cian of the historical adjacency matrix [von Luxburg (2007)] is given in Figure 7.
The structure is interesting, with six of the anomalous nodes appearing together
in pairs at extremes of the diagram. As shown in Ye et al. (2008), these ID pairs
are each actually one individual who switches from using one cell phone to an-
other shortly before the anomalous event occurs. Besides these three pairs, we find
two of the remaining five individuals declared significant in the social network by
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FIG. 5. Top left: Distribution of phone call start times throughout the day across the whole network
for the VAST 2008 data set. Top right: Call counts across the whole network after days have been
split into five homogeneous intervals. Bottom left: Number of active nodes in each subinterval. Bottom
right: Total call durations across the network in each subinterval.
Ye et al. (2008), although all are very much toward the center of our filtered graph
and so are clearly important figures. Having found the major anomalous activity, it
is a small matter to identify the remaining participants. Caller ID 200, for example,
is the leader of the social network but is not detected as anomalous by our method;
however, a simple investigation of the call activity of the set of anomalous nodes
detected reveals ID 200 to be the most frequent communicator in the network with
this group, and then the undetected ID 3 is one of only six nodes who ever com-
FIG. 6. Left: The number of anomalous caller IDs found in each time segment under a
Markov–Bernoulli model. Right: The p-values of the anomalous ID cell-tower usage under the
multinomial model; the circular points are the p-values when the number of calls is treated as ran-
dom, the crosses consider the number of calls as a known quantity.
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FIG. 7. Calls between cell phones during the most anomalous period, occurring at the start of the
eighth day. Nodes which were identified by Ye et al. (2008) as suspicious are colored red; nodes
identified as anomalous in the present analysis are circled.
municate with the network leader; finally, as noted in Ye et al. (2008), “the person
whose ID is 0 communicated with all the important people who communicated
with 200.”
To better understand the nature of the anomalous behavior of the circled nodes
in Figure 7, we monitor their collective call activity and cell-tower usage as a group
using the multinomial model from Section 3.4 with a Poisson–gamma model for
the number of calls; the cell towers reveal the group’s locations on the fictional
island each day and so enable us to track their movements. The group’s p-values
from the multinomial model for each of the ten days are shown in Figure 6(right),
with the two sets of values corresponding to considering the number of calls made
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as either fixed or random. In obtaining these results, a Poisson–gamma(16/9, 2/9)
model was used for the number of calls so that the expected number of calls
equaled the number of nodes, and a flat Dirichlet αk = 1/30 prior used for the
multinomial model; see Supplement A [Heard et al. (2010)] for details. In terms
of call volumes, the six and seventh days see a big drop in the group’s call activity
from an average of over eight calls per day to just one and two calls in total on
those two respective days, followed by a surge of call activity on the important
anomalous eighth day (30 calls) and onward (23 and 27 calls respectively). From a
cell tower perspective, day 2 is found to be fairly anomalous as the group moves to
using a new cell tower, number 30 (three times), whereas day 3 sees a shift in the
balance of how the same set of towers are used. Besides the high call volumes, the
eighth day also sees the group use seven hitherto unused cell towers—towers 7, 9,
17, 20, 21, 22 and 28, and the ninth day sees a first use of towers 2 and 12. The
predictive p-values drop to near zero on these days.
6. Discussion. We have presented a simple statistical framework for monitor-
ing dynamic social networks, by viewing the frequency of connections between
node pairs as simple counting processes. Bayesian learning of the distribution of
these counts enables predictive p-values to be determined for a new observation.
Once a collection of interesting nodes have been identified in this way, standard
network analytical methods can be used to identify the anomalous network struc-
ture.
This methodology has been successfully applied to real and simulated data sets
of moderate size in this paper. Further, it has been remarked that because the
methodology is mostly parallelizable and the networks are typically sparse, scal-
ing to very large networks is feasible. For the data sets presented here the analysis
is already fast; for example, for the VAST data set preprocessed into time series
of length 50, identifying anomalous individual activity from the 400 IDs either as
callers or through being involved in calls took 2.0 seconds. This timing is based on
code run on Matlab 7.3.0 using one core on a 64-bit 1.86 GHz Xenon quad-core
machine.
In both analyses, there was agreement across different count models about the
peak of anomalous behavior. Spectral clustering was used to identify structure in
the anomalous subnetwork, which was in agreement with knowledge from other
sources.
The European Media Monitor data were from a two and a half year collection
period; this could be considered as only a moderate amount of time in politics,
probably overseeing at most one change in government in any represented country,
for example. The simulated cell phone data covered a very short period, just ten
days. The methodology presented is well suited to short or medium term modeling,
as a global model is fitted across the whole time line and anomalies detected with
respect to this global model.
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For a longer term view, a global model is not appropriate, as even normal be-
havior between individuals would be expected to evolve. An adaptive changepoint
model with local models fitted within shorter blocks of time provides a natural
extension. Such a model would lie comfortably within the Bayesian modeling par-
adigm, although some of the simplicity of computation enjoyed here would be
lost.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Supplement A: Hurdle exponential family distributions (DOI: 10.1214/10-
AOAS329SUPPA; .pdf). Details of the Bayesian inferential models considered in
this paper.
Supplement B: Matlab/Octave code (DOI: 10.1214/10-AOAS329SUPPB;
.zip). Matlab code written by DJW for implementing the models used in this paper.
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